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Abstract
In this paper we describe a methodology to implement a fuzzy logic controller in
FPGA. The implementation of fuzzy logic controller (FLC) in FPGA requires a
qualitative and a quantitative analysis to define the system safety integrity level
(SIL). This level can be defined by the quantification of the probability of failure on
demand (PFDavg). We propose to analyze the implementation advance safety
architecture of fuzzy logic controllers with 1-out-of-2 controllers (1oo2) in FPGA
using the reliability block diagram (RBD) and the Markov model. We demonstrate
how from hardware characteristics parameters, such as rate of dangerous detected
failure and undetected failure, the diagnostic coverage, proof test interval and other
parameters to evaluate the PFDavg.
Keywords: fuzzy logic controller, safety integrity level (SIL), mean time to failure
(MTTF), safe failure fraction (SFF), reliability block diagram (RBD),
Markov model, average probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFDavg),
field programmable gate array (FPGA), IEC standard 61508
1. Introduction
A synthesize fuzzy logic controller in field programmable gate array FPGA
means that the VHDL code writing for the systems will be translated into gate,
multiplexer, registers RAM, etc. Very low-level FPGA faults to high-level system
hazards and common cause faults can put the FPGA-based systems in a dangerous
state [1].
However, safety-related issues for FPGA-based systems remain to be not only
verified but also following a safe methodology to design, implementation and
evaluation such systems.
According to [2] the FPGA chip is classified as a type B with very complex
structure. The first step was to perform failure modes, effects, and diagnostic
analysis (FMEDA) for the safety related FPGA-based fuzzy logic controller.
FMEDA is a systematic process used in the development stage of an integrated
circuit to ensure that it meets the pre-determined safety requirements. In the
FMEDA, each component implemented in our FPGA is analyzed for possible
failures and the consequences of these failures on the system.
The design, implementation and evaluation of a fuzzy logic controller in the
field programmable gate array require a qualitative and quantitative analysis
according to IEC 61508. Due to their usage in critical applications, the FLC have a
very stringent average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) requirement.
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This requirement is usually determined by industry standards, such as the safety
integrity level (SIL) rankings. The SIL is defined as a relative level of risk reduction
provides by a safety function for safety function our FPGA-based FLC.
The safety function performed by the FLC maintains a safe state of the system
relative to specific hazardous failures.
The four levels used in IEC 61508 are defined in Table 1 [5] for various fractions
of failures leading to a safe state as follows:
2. Definition and assumptions
2.1 Definition
Presented below is a glossary of terminology on topics related to functional
safety used in this paper.
Diagnostic coverage represents the probability of discovering a failure. Diag-
nostic coverage of the test according to the safety standard Norm IEC 61508 is
defined as the ratio of the rate of detected dangerous failures (by a diagnostic test)
on the total failure of detected and undetected dangerous failure.
Safe failure fraction is used for calculating safety integrity levels (SIL).
Mean time to failure is the average time to the first failure.
Mean time between failure (MTTR) is time between two failures.
Probability of failure on demand (PFD) is a probability on the time interval
that the system could not perform the function of safety for which it was at the time
or the application of this function is made.
The safe failure fraction is defined by the ratio of average failures of safe λS
plus dangerous detected failures λDD and safe plus dangerous detected and
undetected λDU failures. The calculation is based on the architecture of FLC and on
a functional analysis by carrying out a Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analy-
sis (FMEDA).
Safety integrity level (SIL) – Given a SIL to a system is a decision to be taken in
consequence of process hazard and risk analysis. SIL defines the probability of
dangerous failure that a system can be authorized. There are four possibility levels
(SIL1, SIL2, SIL3 and SIL4) defined by safety norm IEC 61508 [2].
Component type A. All failure modes are known and can be detected. The value
of the security factor S for components of type A on a worst-case is defined as
S = 10% [3].
Component type B. All failure modes are not completely known. The value of
the security factor S for components of type B on a worst-case is defined as S = 50%.
Proof test T-proof is periodic tests offline directed to detect failures in a
system so that the system can be repaired to return in a state equivalent to its initial
state.
Safety integrity level Probably of failure on demand
SIL4 104 to 105
SIL3 103 to 104
SIL2 102 to 103
SIL1 101 to 102
Table 1.
Definition of SILs for low demand mode from IEC 61508-1.
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Diagnostic tests are online test to detect hazardous failure. The diagnostic tests
have an in fluent at the level of component (internal) but not at the level of the
function of the security. The watchdog Test, Walking Bit Test and Ram Test are
some example of diagnostic test.
Common mode failure refers to the simultaneous failure that can appear in
two or more channels in a system multiple channels. The introduction of common-
mode failures is generally represented by a factor of β. The 61,508 standard
distinguishes two types of factor for non-detected dangerous failures and detected
dangerous failures. The values for the factors Beta and are generally between 0.5%
and 5% [4].
1oo2 architecture (one-out-of-two) consists of two channels perform each
security function. The security function is executed once a channel request. Only
any dangerous failure will lead to the failure of the function of application of both
channels to lead to the failure of the security function on demand.
Reliability block diagram is a safety analysis for SIL selection for estimating the
performance of systems, other methods are fault tree [6] analysis and Markov
diagrams [7].
2.2 Assumptions
The technique and results developed in this paper are based on the assumptions
following:
• Component failure and repair rate is assumed a constant failure over the life of
the system.
• The hardware failure rates used as inputs to the calculations for a single
channel of the subsystem
• All channels in a voted group have the same failure rate and diagnostic
coverage rate.
• The proof test interval is at least one order of magnitude greater than the
diagnostic test interval
• The demand rate and expected interval between demands are not considered.
• For each component of the safety system, the PFDavg is calculated, for
simplification only from the undetected dangerous failure rate, λDU given in
Table 3 and the proof test interval, Ti.
Other assumptions can be referred to the Annex B of IEC 61508-6.
3. Architecture of fuzzy logic controller
For a simple architecture 1 out of 1 (1oo1), the fuzzy logic controller (FLC)
contains a fuzzification process to change a real scalar input value to fuzzy value, a
fuzzy inference engine for rule based expert systems and defuzzification to change
fuzzy value into real scalar output. Figure 1 presents the basis block diagram of
simple fuzzy logic controller.
The parameter characterizing the present FLC are summarized in Table 2.
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The FLC has two inputs, one with four linguistic terms and the other with three
and an output with three linguistic terms. This makes a total of 4  3  3 different
rules that may be sued to describe the strategy of total control (Figure 2).
The FPGA-based fuzzy logic controller consists of two fuzzy logic controller
(FLC) with the fuzzification process; rule evaluation process and defuzzification
process in a redundant architecture (Figure 3).
In this kind of redundancy, the failure of one channel does not prevent the
execution of the safety function. This architecture will be in dangerous state when
both FLC have dangerous failures. The main advantage of this architecture is his
low probability of failure on demand. Each FLC has diagnostic tests and the results
of both FLC are controlled by the comparison module (Figure 3).
The safety function performed by the FLC maintains a safe state of the system
relative to specific hazardous failures. The safety function is therefore the power
loss for the analog outputs (de-energize-to-trip) of the system in case of dangerous
failures by on-line diagnostics tests. These failures can be interconnect faults, stuck-
at-fault, transition faults, the clock phase shift or a deviation of the value obtained
respectively from the both controller.
Figure 3 shows a basic model for a fuzzy logic controller with redundancy
architecture 1oo2 designed in FPGA.
Figure 1.
Basis block diagram of simple fuzzy logic controller.
Fuzzy inference system
Inputs 2
Outputs 1
Outputs resolution 12 bits
Antecedent MF’s 7 trapezoidal
Antecedent MF resolution 14 bits
Consequent MF’s 3 singleton
Antecedent MF resolution 12 bits
Aggregation method Mandani Min-Max
Implication method Product operator
Defuzzification Weighted average
Table 2.
The parameter characterizing FLC.
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Figure 2.
Design of the present implemented FLC on FPGA.
Figure 3.
Block diagram of the fuzzy logic controller with 1oo2 structure.
5
Functional Safety of FPGA Fuzzy Logic Controller
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.83619
4. RBD and Markov model for safety integrity verification
4.1 Reliability block diagram
The reliability block diagram is a graphical representation of the system. Each
component is represented by a function block in accordance with their logical
relation of reliability (Figure 4). A series connection represent logic “and” of
component and parallel connections represents logic “or”, even as combination of
series and parallel connections represents voting logic.
If a component fails in a series combination, the corresponding connection will
be cut off. Conversely, in a parallel combination, the operation of a single instance is
sufficient for the passage of the signal. System shutdown is only possible if all
parallel instances fail.
Figure 4 presents the reliability block diagram associated to the fuzzy logic
controller with the 1oo2 structure. We take in consideration that the components
have only two operating states (correct or faulty operation).
4.2 Auto diagnostic and common cause
The first step was to perform a failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis
(FMEDA) to detecting the hazardous hardware failures of systems. A failure is
called safe if it does not put the FLC in a dangerous state when a hazardous fault
occurs. A dangerous failure puts the logic controller in a potentially dangerous state
and makes the system inoperative.
They are failure rates partitioned into four categories:
• Safe failure rate λs - do not have the potential to put the system in an hazardous
state and is equal to the sum of safe detected failure rates λSD and safe
undetected failure rate λSU
• Dangerous failure rate λD - have the potential to put the system in an hazardous
state and is equal to the sum of dangerous detected failure rates λDD and
dangerous undetected failure rate λDU
Figure 4.
Reliability block diagrams analysis.
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• Dangerous detected failure λDD - is detected by the on-line diagnostics tests
and the system will be placed into safe state.
• Dangerous undetected failure λDU - is undetected by on-line diagnostics tests
and the system will not be placed into safe state.
By redundancy systems the combination of on-line diagnostic and common-
cause was included. Since the failure is partitioned into eight categories [7].
• Safe, detected normal λSDN
• Safe, detected, common-cause λSDC
• Safe, undetected normal λSUN
• Safe, undetected common cause λSUC
• Dangerous, detected normal λDDN
• Dangerous, detected, common-cause λDDC
• Dangerous, undetected normal λDUN
• Dangerous, undetected common cause λDUC
The possible failures of the fuzzy inference engine implemented in FPGA and
their classification are presented in Table 3.
Type of failure Potential causes Diagnostic test Classification of failure
Hazardous hardware
failure in module
fuzzification
Stuck-at Low or Stuck-
at High anomaly at the
internal FPGA
component
Periodic
comparison of
the result of the
redundancy
controllers.
Dangerous detected
Failure λDD
Hazardous hardware
failure in module
inference rule
Hazardous hardware
failure in module
defuzzification
Failure of an internal
element that does not
intervene in the logic
implemented in FPGA
Stuck-at Low or Stuck-
at High anomaly at the
internal FPGA
component
No diagnostic Since it does not affect the
security function of the FLC
then it is an undetected safe
failure λSU
Flash memory failure
where logic (VHDL
code) is stored.
Hardware fault,
electrostatic
disturbance, magnetic
waves, high voltage
frequencies, etc.
Examining of
cyclic
redundancy
value
A failure in the flash memory
during FLC operation can be
detected only after the mission
time delay Ti. It can therefore
be classified as a detected safe
failure λSD
The drift of the clock Examining via
eatchdog circuit
Dangerous detected
Failure λDD
Table 3.
Failure mode distribution for functional block 3 (FLC).
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4.3 Quantitative analysis using RBD
The structure of reliability block diagram (RBD) defines the logical interactions
of failures within a fuzzy logic controller implemented in FPGA. Each component
of the fuzzy logic controller is a functional block connected by a series for output
module DAC and parallel structure for measurement units. Figure 4 presents the
reliability block diagram associated to each component. The unreliability data for
each subsystem components is given in Table 4. The probability PFDavg is calcu-
lated by summing the probability of failure of all the functional blocks of a FLC. The
quantification of average frequency of dangerous failure of our safety function is
giving by Eq. [8]:
PFDavg ¼ 2 1 βDð Þλ
DD þ 1 βð ÞλDU
 2
tCEtGE þ βDλ
DDMTTRþ βλDU
Ti
2
þMTTR
 
(1)
The time of unavailability of a channel tCE due to a detected dangerous failure is
given by the following formula [8]:
tCE ¼
λDU
λD
Ti
2
þMTTR
 
þ
λDD
λD
MTTR (2)
The time of unavailability of the other channel tGE is also added because of
detected dangerous failure which is represented by the following formula [8]:
tGE ¼
λDU
λD
Ti
3
þMTTR
 
þ
λDD
λD
MTTR (3)
This result gives a PFDavg of 2.7426E03, which corresponds to a safety integ-
rity level of SIL2.
The subsystem PFDavg contribution for the supply voltage is 2.1920E03, for
the fuzzy controller implemented in FPGA is 7.3616E06. That means that the
on-line diagnostics tests implemented for FLC systems in FPGA is with high
performance and efficiency (Figure 5).
4.4 Quantitative analysis using Markov model
Markov modeling brings a good reliability and safety techniques for qualitative
and quantitative analysis that uses state diagrams. This method take account for a
realistic repair time, probability of correct repair, proof test effectiveness, and
automatic diagnostic testing. The Markov system model for redundancy structure
Component HFT PFDavg % of total PFDavg SFF
Supply power 1 2.1920E03 82.93% 90.000%
Clock dispenser 1 1.8785E04 6.84% 92.059%
ADC converter 1 2.1818E04 7.95% 90.235%
Fuzzy controller 1 7.3616E06 0.68% 99.500%
DAC controller 1 5.4770E05 1.99% 95.000%
Total 2.7426E03 100% 92.57%
Table 4.
Failure mode distribution and SIL performance analysis for FLC system.
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1oo2 with only on-line diagnostic is presented in Figure 6. This Markov model of
the 1oo2 architecture contains 6 states [7]:
• The first state (S0): specifies the normal state where the booth controller
properly works.
• The second state (S1): specifies the state where one controller of the system has
a dangerous detected failure by diagnostic with transition probability of 2λDD.
The system can be repaired according to the transition rates μ0.
• The third state (S2): specifies the state where one controller of the system has a
dangerous undetected failure with transition probability of 2λDU and the
second work properly.
Figure 5.
Schematic design of the reliability principle (1oo2).
Figure 6.
Markov model of the 1oo2 architecture diagnostic (no common cause).
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• States (S3), (S4) and (S5): specify a system fail state, where the booth
controllers have a dangerous detected failure by on-line diagnostics tests (S3),
or one controller has a dangerous detected failure also by on-line diagnostics
tests and the other has a dangerous undetected failure (S4), or the booth
channels have a dangerous undetected failure (S5) by on-line diagnostics tests.
A Markov model of 1oo2 structure that take in consideration combination of
different failure modes, on-line diagnostic and common cause is draw in Figure 7
with six states [7].
It has the same state combinations as Figure 6 with two additional failure lines.
There is a dangerous detected common-cause failure rate from state (S0) to state
(S3) and a dangerous undetected common-cause failure rate from state S0 directly
to state (S5). The Markov model of the 1oo2 architecture contains 6 states, in that
case the transition matrix P with dimension (6  6) is given by [7].
p ¼
1 λDC þ 2λDNð Þ 2λDDN 2λDUN 2λDDC 0 λDUC
μ0 1 λD þ μ0ð Þ 0 λDD λDU 0
0 0 1 λD 0 λDD λDU
0 2μ0 0 1 2μ0 0 0
0 0 μ0 0 1 μ0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
2
666666664
3
777777775
(4)
The transition matrix P is a matrix showing the probabilities‘ distribution of
different states in one time interval. This matrix can be multiplied by itself to get
transition probabilities for different time intervals.
The FLC system is starting always by one particular state (S0), so it contains a
single one and a quantity of zeros. The starting probability S would be:
S0 ¼ 1 0 0 0 0 0½  (5)
Figure 7.
Markov model of the 1oo2 architecture—diagnostic and common cause.
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It means that the probability to be in normal state at initial time is 100 and 0%
for the other states.
After 1 year, the system average frequency of dangerous failure of the safety
function is the sum of the of all functional components probabilities of the 1oo2 FLC
systems:
PFDavg ¼ ∑PFDavg_Subsystem (6)
The FLC with 1oo2 structure is always starts in state zero. After n hours, the
calculation process of the distribution probabilities Sn is:
S1 ¼ S0  P
S2 ¼ S1  P
This process can be continued as necessary.
S3 ¼ S2  P
S4 ¼ S3  P
…
Sn ¼ Sn1  P
The Sn matrix for any particular time interval is obtained by multiplying Sn1
times P. This process can be continued as necessary, and the probability distribution
increases progressively each time, then that remains unchanged as time progresses.
If Sn + 1 = Sn a limiting state probability is reached. This matrix is labeled PL.
SL ¼ Sn  P ¼ Sn1  P
The FLC with 1oo2 structure has a safe failure rate of 6.6302E07 failures per
hour and a dangerous failure rate of 1.9118E07 failures per hour. On-line diag-
nostic detect 95% of dangerous failure and 92% of safe failure. When failures are
detected, the average system repair time is 24 hours.
The beta factor β is estimated to be 2%. The failure rates are divided by diag-
nostic capability. The following failure rates result:
λSD ¼ λS  0:92
λSU ¼ λS  1 0:92ð Þ
λDD ¼ λD  0:95
λDU ¼ λD  1 0:95ð Þ
These failure rates are multiplied by beta factor using following equations:
λSDN ¼ 1 βð Þ  λSD
λSDC ¼ β  λSD
λSUN ¼ 1 βð Þ  λSU
λSUC ¼ β  λSU
λDDN ¼ 1 βð Þ  λDD
λDDC ¼ β  λDD
λDUN ¼ 1 βð Þ  λDU
λDUC ¼ β  λDU
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Where the failure rates and repair rates are substituted into the transitionmatrix P,
the following solving for limiting state probabilities, the results are:
SL0 ¼ 0:9583
SL1 ¼ 0:0095
SL2 ¼ 0:0095
SL3 ¼ 0:0093
SL4 ¼ 0:0097
SL5 ¼ 0:0038
Since the system is down (failed) in state 5, the predicted average steady-state
downtime is 0.0038. The control system is successful in state S0, S1 and S2; there-
fore, we add the limiting state probability of the success states equal to 0.9773%.
5. Conclusion
Markov analysis is used to analyze different states that take the system during its
life cycle. Markov analysis provides information on the probability of FLC.
This application contains several important assumptions. First, notice that in
Markov models M-out-of-N the probabilities in each row sum to one. Second, the
probabilities in Markov models will not change over time. Third, the states are
independent over time. In a Markov process after a number of periods (500 hours)
have passed, the probability will approach steady state. For our example, the
steady-state probabilities are:
• 13.5E3 per hour = probability of the FLC to be in a dangerous undetected
failure.
• 1.9E2 per hour = probability of FLC degraded system fail.
However, the reliability block diagram analysis is based on the IEC 61508 inter-
national standard in the calculation of PFDavg. This standard considers all the
parameters defined previously and there is a difference between both type compo-
nents A and B. The type of components allows identifying the safety factor which
contributes directly in the calculation of the PFDavg. Despite this difference
between both standards, both analysis methods give the same results.
The FLC with redundancy structure 1oo2 has a redundant architecture with two
controllers adopted by the FLC and the watchdog. This architecture has a majority
voting arrangement for the output signals. If only one FLC gives a result which
disagrees with the other FLCs, the output state does not change.
The probability of FLC with 1oo2 architecture to be in a dangerous undetected
failure is 2.7426E03 per hour, which relocates the system safety integrity level to
SIL2.
List of abbreviations
ADC analog digital converter
FMEDA failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis
RBD reliability block diagram
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
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DAC digital analog converter
DC diagnostic coverage
E/E/PE system electric, electronic, electronic programmable
FPGA field programmable gate array
ISO International Organization for Standardization
FLC fuzzy logic controller
MTBF mean time between failures
MTTF mean time to failure
MTTR mean time to repair
MooN a system of N redundant channels has a M-out-of-N voting
PFD probability of failure on demand
PFDavg average probability of failure on demand
PFH probability of a dangerous failure per hour
SFF safe failure fraction
SIF safety instrumented function
SIL safety integrity level
SIS safety instrumented system
VHDL very high speed integrated circuit hardware description language
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